Don't Fear the Yield Curve Inversion

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This article originally appeared on ETF.COM here.

On Dec. 3, 2018, the yield curve inverted, with the yield of 2.83% on the five-year Treasury note falling to 1 basis point lower than the yield of 2.84% on the three-year Treasury note. Perhaps that “dreaded” event contributed to the Dow Jones industrial average’s 795 point fall that day.

However, other issues worrying investors also likely contributed to the index’s steep drop: fears of a trade war given that hardliner Robert Lighthizer will lead negotiations with China instead of Steven Mnuchin; the potential for rising interest rates to slow auto and home sales; uncertainty about tax and regulatory policy with Democrats retaking the U.S. House; and even geopolitical risks related to Russian aggression in Ukraine.

All these issues, along with still relatively high U.S. equity valuations (the CAPE 10 remains at about 30), and perhaps warnings by Goldman Sachs that cash would be king, might have played a role in the debacle. That said, let’s focus on the issue of the inverted yield curve.

Looming concern

Investors have been worried about the potential for an inverted yield curve for a long time, as the spreads between longer- and shorter-date securities have been narrowing for most of the past few years, and inverted curves have predicted all nine U.S. recessions since 1955. A July 2018 article I wrote on this subject reproduced the following chart, courtesy of WealthManagement.com, which shows the yield spread between two-year Treasury notes and 10-year Treasury notes during the most recent recessions (shaded in gray).

ETFExplainerXLB

(For a larger view, click on the image above)

Recent history shows that a recession follows yield curve inversion in an average of 16 months, and the setback lasts, peak to trough, for an average of 12 months. My aforementioned July 2018 article discussed why I thought investors generally should not act on what appears to be important information.

I thought I would reinforce that message by providing the historical evidence on equity returns following yield curve inversions, which essentially is that there has not been a strong link between these inversion periods and stock market returns.