Moving Fast and Breaking Things: Mohammad bin Salman, Part II

Currently, the Shiites are the most powerful group in Lebanon because of Hezbollah. This Iranian-linked group is by far the most potent military force in the country; if Lebanon was attacked, Hezbollah would be the primary defender despite the existence of a Lebanese military. Although the post-civil war arrangement remains in place, in reality, any leader in Lebanon has to placate Hezbollah.

Apparently, the KSA has become displeased with Hezbollah’s (and essentially Iran’s) influence in Lebanon. With the collapse of Islamic State, Iran appears to have completed its “Shiite Arc” from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea. Essentially, Iran or its proxies control Iraq, what’s left of Syria and Lebanon.

Forcing Hariri out of office suggests that MbS is trying to contest Iran’s spreading dominance. However, in reality, the KSA has very little influence in the region; its program of funding Sunni groups against Syria has been ineffective. Israel is the most potent force against Hezbollah; although both eye each other warily, neither appears inclined to engage in a war at this time, either. However, Hezbollah reportedly controls 130k medium- to long-range missiles that could overwhelm Israel’s famous “Iron Dome” anti-missile system.[2] At the same time, Hezbollah has expended significant resources fighting in Syria and does not want a war at this time. Thus, forcing Hariri out of office probably won’t change the situation on the ground and, in fact, might make it more dangerous.

The KSA and other GCC nations have called on their citizens to leave Lebanon. Sometimes, such warnings are a precursor to war. However, this was the fourth time in five years that the KSA has ordered its citizens out of Lebanon.[3] Thus, this action is probably not a call to arms.

It is obvious that the Saudis are not pleased with Iran’s steady expansion of power and influence, and the removal of Hariri expresses that sentiment. However, it isn’t clear how that action would curtail Iran’s strength; in fact, it may increase its strength by making the leadership in the KSA appear impotent and rash. Hariri has since returned to Lebanon and “suspended” his resignation. The government in Lebanon has accepted the suspension for now but Hariri’s political capital has been seriously undermined by the events of November 4. Thus, the tenuous political balance in Lebanon will likely be upset by Hariri’s resignation and the potential for unrest has increased.

The Long Weekend: The Missile Attack
On November 4, a Burkan 2-H long-range ballistic missile[4] was launched at Riyadh. Indications suggest it was originally manufactured in Iran.[5] Fortunately for the Saudis, the missile was successfully intercepted by a Patriot missile. The KSA declared the attack an “act of war” and blamed the Houthis, a tribe in Yemen that is primarily Zaidi. The Zaidis are a sect of Shiite Islam. However, the KSA also blamed Hezbollah and Iran for the attack. By declaring this attack an act of war and blaming the Houthis as well as Iran and Hezbollah, the KSA could conceivably retaliate against all three. Such an act would lead to a regional war.

However, so far, the retaliation has been limited to Yemen. The Saudis have conducted extensive air attacks in Yemen and blockaded its ports. To date, the KSA has not taken any direct actions against Iran or Hezbollah.

Iran and Hezbollah do offer some support to the Houthis but there isn’t much evidence to suggest they are directing the war effort. We doubt that the Houthis have an indigenous ballistic missile. On the other hand, the war in Yemen does not appear to have any clear end and the KSA’s involvement there reduces its ability to project power elsewhere. Thus, we expect Iran and, to a lesser extent, Hezbollah, to continue to offer support to the Houthis. However, the conflict in Yemen has its own local issues[6] that have nothing to do with the broader geopolitics of the region. Thus, we doubt that any outside power can actually direct the Houthis. Simply put, they would like the help but would probably shun being controlled by either Iran or Hezbollah.

The Long Weekend: The Religious Crackdown
The alliance between the Wahhabist movement in Sunni Islam and the al-Sauds began in the 18th century during the first Saudi Kingdom. The current state is actually the third iteration of the Saudi kingdom. Throughout Saudi Arabian history, the clerics have been an integral part of the state, giving the al-Sauds religious and political legitimacy. In return, the royal family has given the clerics a nearly free hand in shaping social conditions. For years, the clerics have insisted on keeping gender separation in public life; perhaps its most visible expression has been making it illegal for women to operate a vehicle. But, it goes beyond this; Sharia law is strictly enforced and delivers harsh punishments for those deemed to have committed violations.[7] Infractions can include exposing Shiite beliefs. The clerics had their own police force, the mutwwain, who were given the power to arrest people they viewed as violating Sharia as interpreted by the Wahhabist clerics.

Just before the aforementioned arrests on Saturday, November 4, MbS changed the rules on the religious establishment, dramatically curbing their powers.[8] He took away the power of the mutwwain to arrest people and detained dozens of hardline clerics who opposed the new measures. In September, the KSA moved to allow women to drive.[9] MbS has called for a “moderate, balanced Islam that is open to the world and to all religions and all traditions and peoples.”[10] Such comments are an anathema to the Wahhabist strain of Islam, which views all those outside its sect as heretics.

It should be noted that the religious establishment has been undermined and co-opted over the years. For example, the clerics had to accept the basing of non-Islamic foreign troops in the KSA during the Gulf War. King Fahd’s decision to allow this basing was one of the factors that led Osama bin Laden to break away from the KSA and form al Qaeda, which became a direct threat to the KSA and had to be aggressively attacked by Saudi counterterrorism groups.

The crackdown will be supported by the two primary constituencies noted in Part I. First, if MbS is going to woo foreign investors, moderating the impact of Wahhabi Islam on the KSA is probably required. Second, the religious police are very unpopular with the youth of Saudi Arabia. The mutwwain strive to keep the genders separated, which is something that young people everywhere tend to oppose. Thus, this action is probably necessary to build support among the majority of Saudis and to encourage foreign investment.

Part III
Next week, we will complete this series with a discussion of how these recent events relate to the broader geopolitical context and conclude with market ramifications.

Bill O’Grady
December 4, 2017

[1] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-politics-hariri-exclusive/exclusive-how-saudi-arabia-turned-on-lebanons-hariri-idUSKBN1DB0QL?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews

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